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June 14,1966

MEMO for

STATINTL

It would help me a great deal in preparing the 27 June briefing know the following:

STATINTL

- a) How big will the audience be?
- b) Roughly how big a room is it?
- c) Are there standard Vu-graph facolities?
- d) What will prior briefings have covered?
 (i.e., if the Pentagon has already briefed them on the course of the war in Vietnam, or the Soviet and Chinese military posture, that will amount to significant chunks I don't have to cover--on the other hand, I can readily include these topics if they are not being briefed on them by somebody else.)

Many thanks,


STATINTL

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Ground Rules: I will be working in a great deal of info, and some graphics, which are classified mainly because of attributability. Can do this on basis that it's understood you did not get this from government intelligence sources.

COMMUNIST CHINA



This is face you xkwaxd get to know--possibly next boss of ChiComs, man behind present purge.

Probably exag to describe as greatest purge since 221 BC when Chinese emperors cracked down on Confucian intellectuals, but there are indications we have seen only beginning of monumental uphexval.

(Layout, ChiCom Leadership) Hard to see it as anything but succession struggle. Mao, 73, ailing, out of sight over six mo.

Teng v Peng

Little difference in policies--possible exception "Gr. Leap"-so must be personalities, rivalries.

No difference foreign policy (Map, SEA from Peking) Essentially substandard WW II army at present, but massive army, over 3,000,000, dominates XX SEA landmass. Working on advanced weapons --- we estimate deliverable bomb 2, missile maybe 3 years off.

ne 3 years off. (MAP, ChiCom MRBM Range) Even with slow deployment, IOC of 1,000-mile MRBM puts

ChiComs in strong blackmail position.

Making MIG-19, building submarines, was almost entirely on own hook with base Sovs gave them before 1960.

Economic underpinning (MAP, Arable areas) Foreign trade with Free World now exceeds that with USSR Purchases largely wheat

What would bring ChiComs into NVN?

Air defenses beefed up as long ago as Tonkin indident, No change ground forces --- about half a million men within M plus 48 of border anyway, and large NVN forces as yet uncommitted. ChiComs probably want to avoid direct confrontation if possible. Would take US invasion NVN or threat of complete collapse of NVN govt. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000300050001-9

North Vietnam

(Photo, SA-2 site)

While we're at the border, might take quick look at North Vietnam. - Focus of attention, of course, is air raids, and you may recall state of alarm a little over a year ago when after Kosygin's visit, we found first SA-2 sites. This is one of them. There now more than 100 such sites, possibly 20 to 25 batteries.

(Map. North Vietnam)

This is SAM envelope—should go farther South to Vinh. Fact of matter is, however, SA-2 has not been as effective as either we or Russians probably expected. As of mid-June, aircraft losses in combat 252 aircraft, but bulk of these—zhanzx2izzz at least 215—to conventional AAA; 14 to 18 to SAMS, 2 to MIGs. Inordinately high number of SAM missiles fired —possibly 300 for 14 to 18 kills. NVN crews, maintenance problems, evasive tactics. Overall losses, incidentally, running about 3.5 per thousand sorties, which is compares very favorably with our losses in Korea or WW II.

South Vietnam

Recently, political. Ky regime has set record for longevity, passing anniversary this month, surmounting threat from Buddhists. May actually pull off September election. Buddhists essentially negative. We have never learned just what men like Tri Quang want, except they don't want whatever govt is in power at moment. Possible trauma from minority rule of Diem days, but Buddhists themselves actually minority too. Problem is SVN really can't afford luxury of true democracy and party politics at this stage, when half the country exposed to VC domination.

Yet there have been elections--May last year 70% of eligibles registered, 70% of registered voted. Promise for future

As for civil war:

Almost 900,000 refugees "voted with feet" 1965 VC killed or kidnapped over 13,600 civilians---incl. at least 2,600 district and village officials.

Chieu Hoi: 1964 ca 14,000, 1965 42,500, same time identifiable VC rose from 1,903 to 9,472, including number of VC political functionaries

1966 first 4 months 4,631 military out of 7,500 total (drops with threats to stability)

(Three SVN Charts)

Not going to give you blow by blow mil briefing, but want to show you three charts from 1965 which will show you what US presence since mid-1965 has accomplished. (talk from charts) We now have initiative, Commies been unable to pull off major offmensive in either of two monsoon seasons.

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 n.CIA-RDR79T00827400030005000649 to 35,400 1965, over 20,000 first 5 mo this year, but Commie mannower keeps rising.

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Infiltration at least 22,000 last year per MACV, already in excess of 24,000 this yr including cfd, prob, poss. Despite kill, now 15 PAVN 12 VC regiments in cfd OB. Main Force 90,000 combat, 17,500 support, 11,000 probables for 119,000. Paramilitary 103,600, APC 39,200 another 16,400 probable, makes total of 278,000 men in field. (Allies 700,000 GVNs, approaching million total---sizable detachments Koreams, (will be 40,000) 4x000x 4,500 Aussies, etc.)

(MAP, Laos) routes)

Here's how enemy keeps coming in. And fact of life is we estimate for his kind of warfare, takes 12 tons a day to support 110 bns 1/35 days. Would take possibly 170 tons 155 bns 1/3 days. (Now 131 known bns, 27 probable, but not fighting **xx** that often.) During dry season, estkmated 70/90 tpd coming into north end Ho Chi Minh trail, 50/70 tpd out bottom into SVN. Capacity Laos road net in dry season perhaps 400 tpd. You can bomb--but cf Mu Gia bypasses. Building these all over(PHOTO, trellis) Conceal roads in jungle. In final analysis, that 12 tons a day can come down jungle trails on coolie backs.

LAOS Mil siun generally stable, some fighting in North, Commie sensitivity in south to protect panhandle routes. Possibly 10,000 PAVN in country, mainly panhandle. Souvanna gotten over neutralism. (Map, Cambodia)

CMNBODIA Shnook trying to avoid involvement but build

CMMBODIA Shnook trying to avoid involvement but build for what he sees as future. Very little doubt his terr being used, but it's (a) disputed (b) remote unpopulated (c) poorly controlled by Phnom Penh--local officers make deals (d) scared of Commies. Cambodian terr used for transit and 3R's--rest, reinforcement, and rice.

Latent dissidence.

THAILAND

(Map, Thailand)

Peking has ordered Communists to stp up subversion. Sev1 fronts maintained in Peking. Guerrilla bands, prob. with NVN stiffening, becoming more active in NE. 25 incidents first four months, multiple of rates of previous years. Promising Civic action program, good beginning on CI ops. But very remote, poor communications.

PM THA-nome, deputy Prah-PAHTT give stable and firm leadership.

Clashes along 400-mile border with Cambodia

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Suharto---determined but cautious

Needs Sukarno, can't move too fast and far against him.

PKI virtually destroyed, but S has picked up one faction of Moslems

Regime cannot appear too pro-western.

DIRECTOR'S BACKGROUND BRIEFING BOOK

INDONESIA-MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE

- I. Indonesia and Malaysia appear to be making slow progress toward at least an informal end of confrontation.
 - A. Indonesia's complex domestic political situation, however, is interfering with efforts to reach a settlement.
- Bangkok on 1 June but so far it has not been made public. The agreement provides for the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations, the cessation of hostilities, and a reaffirmation in Malaysia's Borneo territories—Sabah and Sarawak—as to their desire to remain in Malaysia; this last phase is to be carried out by general elections "as soon as practicable."
 - A. President Sukarno so far has refused to sign this agreement; he insists that a plebiscite be held in Malaysian Borneo before the other provisions of the agreement are implemented.

INDO-MAL-SING-1

Chapter

- B. A meeting of the Crush Malaysia Command

 (KOGAM) on 8 June, chaired by Sukarno, con
 cluded that the Bangkok settlement constitute

 only a basis for agreement and that many de
 tails still needed clarification and solution
 - 1. To this end, Indonesian army chief General Suharto is to arrange continuing communication between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur.
 - 2. It would appear, therefore, that although Sukarno may try to obstruct on the one hand, government leaders on the other will be continuing their own efforts for a solution.
- III. Given Sukarno's intransigence on confrontation,
 Indonesia's ruling triumvirate--General Suharto,
 Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and the economic
 czar, the Sultan of Jogjakarta--feel that further
 efforts are required within Indonesia's domestic
 political arena to reduce Sukarno's role and to
 strengthen their own position.
 - A. They hope to do this through action by the Indonesian congress (MPRS), tentatively scheduled to convene in mid-June.

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- 1. Complicating this anti-Sukarno strategy, however, is decreasing civilian support for the army and developing fragmentation among civilian political groups.
- 2. There is some question as to how far the MPRS will go in supporting Suharto and Malik against Sukarno.
 - a. Should the triumvirs assess prospects as poor, they probably would postpone the session—a move, however, which presumably they would take with some reluctance since it would only increase civilian discontent.
- IV. Malaysia has already approved the Bangkok settlement and seems to understand the domestic complexities that beset Indonesia.
 - A. A top Malaysian Foreign Ministry official plans to visit Djakarta shortly for talks with Suharto, and plans are underway to exchange military missions which will undertake further discussions.
- V. Despite positive indications toward a settlement, there has been no change in the low-keyed

TEDOLMAT. SING. 9

Indonesian paramilitary activity directed against Malaysia.

- A. Activity against the Malaysian peninsula is limited to small intelligence teams that are usually captured.
- B. Along the Malaysian Borneo border, however, routine patrolling and shallow incursions continue, and operations are still being planned.
- C. An Indonesian incursion, particularly one which utilized indigenous Chinese subversives in Sarawak--who in themselves are a Malaysian security problem--would cause doubts in Kuala Lumpur as to Djakarta's good will.
- VI. On 2 June Djakarta extended formal recognition to Singapore thereby concluding initiatives it had begun several months ago.
 - A. Singapore, in order not to exacerbate relations with Kuala Lumpur, has agreed to delay the establishment of diplomatic relations with Djakarta until the Malaysian-Indonesian settlement is finalized.

MINO-MAL-SING-4

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MAP, India -Pakistan

- India and Pakistan have to be considered as one situation because they are so interrelated in what makes them tick
- Famine; Chinese Communists; Kashmir as a symbol of cohesion, integrity of Indian nation. With their many ethnic and linguistic groups, they don't dare let it go on ethnic or religious grounds. Nagas, frinstance. Mizo guerrillas in Assam.

India -- help from both Sovs and West.

min. dom. req. 11-12 million tons of wheat port problem. next six months.

Mrs. Gandhi good ministers, indecisive in party maneu-1967 elections. vering.

Pakistan - sees any aid to India as directed specifically This made rapprochement with ChiComs against Pak. natural devedopment. Bhutto, anti-US, out, but General Ayub was main architect anyway, probably still sees reliance on China in same light, will play it in softer key.

Separatism problem, East Pakistan. felt let down

in recent fighting.

Paks may have had edge, but wound up in poorer position because they don't have the hardware recoup (armorand and air) powers

Post-Tashkent talks still going on, but all immediate improvements have been realized, little progress on basic issues, and propaganda heating up again.

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MAP, Middle East

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Iran

Frustrated with US on arms, with West generally on oil--Shah wanted 17-20%, consortium agreed to 9 plus or 11 minus.

Suspicion of Arab intentions. Shatt el Arab. White revolution, but still feels he's sitting on any extremely shaky throne.

Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have all turned receptive to Soviet offers. --to tune of some \$500,000,000 last year.

Iraq

Yemen

Nasirists and Kurds. (Barzani may buy deal) Bazzaz trying get more \$ from British Iraq Petroleum Co
No settlement in sight despite Kuwaiti efforts at good offices. Basic distrust Nasir/Faysal. Nasir determination keep after Brits Aden etc. Effect on Saudi - UK relations. Nasir working in truciad sheikdoms, Oman, South Arabian Fed. Possibly in Saudi A. Brit dismantlement along Persian Gulf adds to Shah's discomfiture.

Syria

Baathist radicals seized power from moderates in Feb, have allowed Bakdash return after 8 years in bid for broad leftist support. Trying to improve rels with USSR. Moscow providing zedix credits for Euphr. dam.

Against them, Baath moderates, Nasir, conservatives. Some military support. Could be countercoup at any time.

Jordan

Tightrope act between Nasir outside, Palestinians inside, irked Israelis not being helpful. United Arab Command squeeze to open door to Soviet aircraft, Nasir "technicians" Leaning hard on US, UK, Saudis for dough.

UAR

Nasir swinging between attempt to lead Arab world, concentration on domestic problems. Rels with US in sour period, but needs \$150 million in food aid. Economy in poor shape. Puts politics above economics——jobs and bonuses for all. Yemen is sore point, could disgruntle army leaders. His foreign adventurism somewhat reduced, now concentrating on combatting Faysal's concept of Islamic solidarity, which N. reads as solidarity against Egyptian leadership.

MAP, Israel

ARAB-ISRAELI With Arabs thus divided, heat is down somewhat between Arabs, Israelis as contrasted to period of such schemes as Arab Jordan diversion project. Israelis reacting sharply to border raids, could make reprisal attacks any time, meanwhile determined to maintain qualitative superiority over Arabs which poses problems for US, UK, France, Germany. (Note switch on Faysal, New York, and Cairo propaganda.) (The friend of my

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Nasir trying to link recent US arms agreements with Jordan, Saudis, Israel (48 subsonic A4F attack bombers)

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Cyprus

Political temperature on Cyrpus up again.

Makarios twice this month has blockaded Turkish sector of Nicosia, citing bombing incidents in Greek sector. Actually part and parcel of his strategy to erode position of Turk CypsxxI and their confidence in their leadership both on island and in Turkey. Turks didn't help by making what amounted to ultimatum and then taking no action. Athens has very limited means of restraining Makarios. If nothing else, such actions remind Greek and Turkish negotiators that Makarios will have x tirtually final say on any agreements over future of the island.

Turkish Cypriots aim for de facto partition, and they took a step in this diffection, without running counter to aims of Makarios, when they withdrew their judges from Nicosia courts—one of few remains of official cooperation between the two communities.

Still possibility Turks may in fact react in desperation, but there has been no return to the likelihood of such action that existed in June of 1964, altho ** Turks would be better prepared for it now.

Cyppus has created difficulties in US rels with both Greece and Turkey--especially Turks

Greeks wants enosis---union with Greece--have Gen. Grivas and strong Greek troop oncitngent on Cyprus to see if this cant be brought about. So far, Makarios remains outside their control, acting independently. Greek govt too shaky to take strong action, too shaky to put across the concessions which would have to be made for any agreement with Turkey.

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AFRICA

Map, Africa

(18)

New countries kneed of Africa has little stability. Leadership is awfully thin, and elements of power very shallow. A few determined and armed men can take over a country, as in Zanzibar. Add to this Sino-Soviet competition, directed both against each other and against Western world----the scars of colonial admin, the vast expectations of the Africans, --and you have a volatile situation which is surprising only in that there has been as much stability as existed over the past few years.

Example of Sino-Soviet competition: Ghana under Nkrumah. Research Institute---Sov/E.Ger. \$1 million equipment, mostly from USSR. Meanwhile ChiComs ran camp in abandoned gold mine 140 miles up country---not just colonials, Congolese, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Camerocons---anybody who opposed radical African states.

CONGO(L) Mobutu playing hard nationalist line, being excessively tough with Belgians. Moved steadily toward one-man rule, suspicions of all others. Admittedly has severe problem establishing control, but he is often more disruptive than constructive, and in field of economy doesn't understand facts of life. For instance has decreed Congolese goods after June 30 cant move over Angola, which will hit Katangan exports hard.

Rebels still in bush, far from stamped out and could become active again if Mobutu, as threatens in his present nationalist mood, dismisses mercenaries.

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skimmed non-classified highlights from

DCI's BACKGROUND BRIEFING BOOK on

Rhodesia 1 June

White Southern Africa 13 May

Kenya 12 May

Uganda 1 June

Tanzania 11 May

Nigeria 1 June

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Radicals somewhat in disarray

Nkrumah out in Ghana

Sekou Toure somewhat disillusioned with Moscow/Peking

Mali not getting help it wants from Moscow, Chinese apparently can't help enough

Somalia faction-ridden, quarreling with Ethiopia, Kenya

Sudan preoccupied with internal chasm between N and S

Ethiopia --- who will follow Emperor?

Modern ruler, long lifetime, hasn't been able to produce modern government.

DCI Briefing Book:

The Horn 1 June

Algeria 12 May

Morocco 26 April and last week's SIG

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LATIN AMERICA

Could have mentioned counter-insurgency in connection with any area, but Latin America offers some of best examples of problems and cures.

(MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM 1959)

Here's SVN five years after Dien Bien Phu, when Hanoi ordered stay-behind guerrilla assets to begin operations. Note six red spots, and how they grew in succeeding

MAP, Colombia

Here's another map with six red splotches---Colombia, showing the areas which have been referred to as Communist enclaves.

Colombia plagued by bandits who made countryside unsafe as far back as Spanish vice-regency of 16h century. until 1930s that bandityy took on polotical overtones. When Liberal Party election victory ended 30 years of Conservative Party rule, an outbreak of vicious partisan killings swept country. There was a religious fervor to party affiliations --- and in fact, Church-State controversy 1946, power changed x hands again. entered into it. Liberals rallied around Gaitan. Assassination in Bogota in 1948 led to Bogotazo, army take-over by Rojas Pinilla. Opposition to him finally ended the political m gang warfare in hinterland as his opponents united to get rid of him, but meanwhile 1948 to 1964, by conservative estimate 150,000 killed --- some estimates double that.

Psychotic, senseless terror continues, and Commies /have made their way into some of the more durable bandit /gangs, taking over or getting ear of outlaw chiefs.

Under Rojas, army punished, counter-terrored. Since almost 20 mil/then, learned civic action. Viota, Sumapaz, Popular Cultural /Action (church-sponsored, 800 radio schools.) Market roads.

To North of Bogota, Santander province, Cuban-sponsored ELN guerrillas.

We're in band-aid stage of CI, civic action, patching up vulnerabilities so Commies can't exploit, rather than eliminating them. Takes patience. Colombia good start, maybe splotch map won't go way of SVN.

Map, Cuba

In Cuba , status of Castro causing some puzzlement right now. Not playing public role to which we have become accustomed, but he may be sick or exhausted. Maybe to divert from Econ Gitmo alert unexplained. Close to Moscow, flays ChiComs--Mao "senile" Subversion: Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia. Where's Che?

Approved for more foreign exchange and can probably continue Map, Latin Am roly on grudging Sov Assistance.

CPC under

20,000 of

qoq

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Had LA Sections of DCI's global briefing book along, but because of time, touched briefly on status in Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Guatemala, rift in Communist parties, and, in answer to pazzmæx questions, Guyana, Panama, fortunately Argentina----military patience has eroded again and govt may be ousted any moment----Peru Brazil